How India can build resilience against disinformation, cyberattacks and the war of narratives - and win the second front of modern conflict.
The post, being from the second-largest economy in the world, China, holds a credible value to be propagated by the media across the world. Therefore, the views of this post are not only limited to the audience of a social media agency but also to the audience of the whole world. Here, the narrative projected restricts or prohibits India from defending or protecting its stance on the case, making Pakistan the winner in the conflict. This post, where China had provided updates and information on missiles and aircraft across the world, had attracted more buyers for its defence equipment. This, in turn, has led to the spread of misinformation and propaganda throughout the world. The Indian embassy in China had cautioned the Chinese state-run media organisation “Global Times” to verify before posting any updates about Indian military operations.
Today, influence plays a major role in this digital age, where each and every country wants to assert its dominance and gain attention from the world. These days, citizens are curious to hear the stories of success and struggles of the countries around the world. Now these stories can be either real or an act of manipulation made by that country in order to gain support from the entire world, hence causing the war of narratives. There can be numerous ways to initiate such kind of warfare, thus calling it a non-traditional warfare with the help of technologies like AI, in this digital era. As Sun Tzu in his classic military treatise The Art of War, rightly points out that all war is based on deception. NATO, in turn, has defined Information Warfare as operations conducted to gain an information advantage over an opponent, which includes controlling one’s own information space and protecting its access to information, as well as practising means to acquire and use the opponent’s information.
Therefore, the wars and conflicts in the 21st Century are no longer confined traditionally, but they are also fought creatively through innovative digital means, including bytes, bots, digital actors and carefully crafted narratives. Disinformation, cyberattacks and manipulation of perceptions are certain acts that cause information warfare, meaning that nations can win or lose before this invisible battle is fought.
The early conception of information warfare can be traced back to the ancient times of the Mahabharata around 1,000 to 3,000 BCE. The defeat of Bhishma led Guru Drona to be the Chief Commander of the war on the Kauravas’ behalf. While Lord Krishna was aware that it was impossible to defeat Guru Drona, he decided to play a tactic regarding his son Ashwathama’s death, to manipulate and divert Guru Drona’s attention. During the war, the Pandavas killed an elephant named Ashwathama and declared that Drona's son Ashwathama had died. It was a false rumour that Ashwathama (an elephant, not the person) had been killed. While Lord Krishna was aware of Guru Drona’s trust in Yudhisthira, he orchestrated this deception by having Yudhisthira announce the death. Making Guru Drona emotionally vulnerable through this strategy, it became easy for the Pandavas to defeat him in the wars that followed. Another instance from the Mahabharata can be seen in the form of espionage, where Arjuna, during his exile, became Brihannala, who was a eunuch (in traditional Sanskrit literature, described as a napunsaka) in the Virata kingdom. Apart from not being recognised as the warrior in the first place, this was also done as a strategy to build an alliance with the King of Virata, to fight in the battle against the Kauravas.
Later, from the early to mid-20th century, the phenomenon of information warfare gained relevance as an effective means of manipulation. The Second World War had not only seen the military might of the Allied forces and the Axis powers, but also the continuous wave of disinformation campaigns through initiatives like Operation Overlord (D-Day) and the involvement of the Ghost Army (a deception unit having 23rd Headquarters Special Troops). The Allied forces initiated a move known as the Ultra (the codename for intelligence derived from decrypted Enigma messages), which was pulled off by their codebreakers to break the Enigma Code used by the Germans to encrypt communication. This initiative was declared successful in deciphering messages and gaining valuable intelligence on the plans and movements of the German adversaries. Through Operation Bodyguard, the Allied forces carried out various deceptive methods to mislead the Germans regarding the landing date, time and place. Apart from this, they have also enhanced the psychological warfare by deploying fake armies, thus creating a lot of confusion and distraction among the enemies and weakening their morale through radio broadcasts, leaflets, etc. This shows that the Allied forces, despite winning over the Axis powers militarily, also succeeded in waging an information warfare against their adversaries.
Following this, the Cold War period also saw an unprecedented wave of information warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two superpowers deployed various media, cultural influences and strategic messages to assert narratives and objectives on the global stage. The Soviet Union developed a broad campaign, known as Aktivnyye Meropriyatiya, to influence populations across the globe through oral and written disinformation, forgeries and false rumours, manipulation, propaganda, control of foreign media assets, political blackmail, etc. Much of their agendas were focused on influencing the global opinion against the US, thus declaring the US’s policies as threatening and labelling the country as colonialist, aggressive, imperialist, etc. To conduct the disinformation act and direct propagandist measures, the Soviet Union also established departments like the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the International Information Department of the CPSU, aimed at spending large amounts of money $3 billion per year, on their programs. Additionally, Operation INFEKTION was launched by the Soviets, a disinformation campaign fabricating claims about the US allegedly creating the AIDS virus. Similarly, the US also established various effective campaigns against the Soviet Union, combining covert and overt programs. These incidents also mark the period of early cyber operations, where both parties began the use of computer networks for espionage and the disruption of information. This was done by committing a handful of resources to electronic surveillance and extracting intelligence from the same against each other.
Much of the information warfare phenomenon during the post-Cold War Period was derived from the Western Liberal Democratic States. The Western influence in information warfare was specific in the military sphere; it led to the development of electronic warfare, military deception, psychological operations and information operations security. These methods acted as an effective tool for gaining battlefield advantage by improving performance in intelligence gathering, targeting, command and control, etc. During the 1991 Gulf War, under Operation Desert Storm, the American troops dominated the Iraqi army by disrupting its communications and dominating the intelligence field. Moreover, media management has also become an important factor under the Western notion of information warfare, reflected during the 1991 Gulf War, where effective control of the media in providing the information approved by military officials to the masses was rewarded by building the narrative of a just and humanitarian war. In contrast, the Vietnam War saw civil protests in the United States as they were unable to control the media. During the US invasion of Afghanistan, while the Americans were unable to address their motive in doing the same, the international media played a huge role in promoting propaganda, aiming at influencing world opinion against the US forces. Additionally, Cyber-terrorism has also gained prominence under this concept, dating back to late 1980s. The 11 September 2001 attacks have allowed the mainstream media to discuss the potential threats of cyberterrorism, including sabotaging critical infrastructure while putting human lives in jeopardy, and disrupting the national economy.
Influenced by the above conception, information warfare was also experienced in various parts of the world. In 1998, Spanish protesters bombarded the Institute of Global Communications with thousands of emails, making it undeliverable to ISP users. According to the protestors, the IGC supported terrorism, which was evident on the institute’s webpage, mentioning a terrorist group’s Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). In response to the email bombings and the proposed allegations, IGC had pulled back the webpage. In the same year, the ethnic Tamil Guerrillas in Sri Lanka attempted to disrupt Sri Lankan embassies by sending a large volume of emails. Around 800 emails a day over a two-week period were received by the embassy. According to the intel authorities, this case was perceived as the first-known terror attack against a country’s computer systems.
“It is said that in a war the first casualty is truth” - U.S. Senator Hiram Johnson (1917)
For ages, India has been the victim of multiple information warfare waged against it. One such instance can be traced back to the 1962 Sino-India war, where China initiated propaganda and psychological attacks to affect the war outcome. China had lowered the confidence of the world in India by declaring that India was not adequately prepared for a war. China had also used border disputes as a pretext for its attack against India, and declared its attack was only a defensive approach to secure its national interest. China also sought to shape the international public opinion by presenting its action as a response to India’s encroachment and its commitment to peace.
Traces of information warfare against India can also be found in Operation Gibraltar in the year 1965, when Pakistan Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik sent infiltrators who crossed the limits of the ceasefire as local mujahideens along with the troops to mobilise the muslim population to rebel against the Indian government. They saw an opportunity to start unrest in Jammu and Kashmir after the disappearance of a holy relic from Srinagar’s Hazratbal shrine in 1963. Retired Pakistani General Akhtar Hussain Malik described the operation’s goals and objectives in his book, ‘Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror’ as "to defreeze the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring India to the conference table without provoking general war". This operation was one of the most crucial instances of information warfare against India, using religion as a medium to influence one-fourth of the Indian population to rebel against the government.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Kashmir Information Warfare against India can be seen when anti Indian communities started using the Islamic religion as a medium to make announcements in mosques, through loudspeakers, newspapers, leaflets and pamphlets to eliminate the pro-India and moderate voices of Kashmir. These communities have also closed cinema halls deliberately, declaring their activities to be un-Islamic. Apart from these ways, the anti-India communities have also chanted anti-India slogans on roads and exhibited religious extremism to mark Kashmir as a part of Islamic unity. All these tactics are used to mobilise the entire population against the Indian regime and to gain independence from India.
Post 1999 Kargil war, Pakistan denied the attack and its military involvement, depicting the attack as a work of “mujaheeds” fighting for the independence of Kashmir. Narratives were made to distance the Pakistani army from the attack, framing it as a Kashmir struggle to manipulate India’s stance on the same. This move has changed the entire narrative globally against India and Kashmir. However, 25 years down the line Pakistani Army Chief publicly acknowledged the role of the Pakistani Army and its direct involvement in the war, describing the true motive of the Pakistani Army and its national agenda.
“San zong zhanfa”, a three-pronged war strategy by China in 2003, which includes psychological warfare, covert and overt media warfare and legal warfare. During the Doklam standoff in 2017, China used this technique to influence the domestic and international public in support of its action. With every media outlet amplifying Chinese messages, China used its approach of psychological warfare to create pressure on the Indian government. China even called the then foreign minister, Sushma Swaraj, a liar, and propagated a message that India was interfering in the Kashmir issue. Even today, the pictures of the 1962 war flood the Chinese media.
Pakistan’s propaganda warfare against India rapidly increased after India decided to abrogate Article 370 in August 2019. Pakistani army’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) used various social media agencies and reports to spread propaganda against India, along with continuous usage of social media to trend hashtags like #hinduterrorism, #islamindanger, #rsskilling, #freekashmir, etc. Various Pakistani media channels have drawn a comparison of Narendra Modi with Adolf Hitler and Indian Muslims with Jews. Further, with the advent of social media and taking advantage of the aspect of digital illiteracy, Pakistan succeeded in brainwashing the mindset of Indian youth and recruiting them as ‘mujaheeds’ for Jihad, as well as recruiting them in espionage activities. The majority of these Indian Youth were muslims who got radicalised and brainwashed by the propagating Islamic community is in danger.
The report released in March 2020 by the special branch of Delhi police titled ‘fake news of Delhi protests in social media’ claimed that over 100 accounts of Insaf Students Foundation’s social media wing, which is the student wing of the Tehreek-e-Insaf Party, were created under Hindu names, spreading fake news and rumours to project Delhi riots as “anti-muslim genocide”. Through hashtags and anti-muslim slogans, this student-led community had succeeded in waging the information warfare against the country. Old images from Syria and Bangladesh were also spread on social media, depicting the images of Delhi riots instead, to create India’s image as a muslim oppressor state. The motive of portraying India as an anti-Islamic nation is a part of Pakistan’s information warfare from the early 1960s till today, to manipulate the muslim population of India.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, China was accused of spreading disinformation about the efficacy of Indian vaccines and the origin of the virus. By using social media, China started propagating fake narratives. It’s state-owned media channel, Global Times, published various reports, talking about the ineffective handling of the pandemic by the Indian government, and accused India of engaging in the border tussle with China and Pakistan to divert attention from COVID-19.
Talking about Western media bias against India and how it has been propagating narratives against it, Western media houses deliberately exaggerate India’s flaws and even portray the country’s picture wrongly when it comes to depicting India’s accomplishments, as these media houses are unhappy with India’s autonomous foreign policy. They started providing false information on India about the COVID-19 pandemic, quoting false data about death tolls and India’s healthcare systems, thus exaggerating about conditions of the Indian citizens on the same. They described India’s situation during the pandemic as the country being unable to cope with the situation, leading to its sudden collapse. Other than this, these media houses have also compared these conditions with the 1918 Spanish flu conditions and the 1948 Bengal famine. Big media conglomerates like The NewYork Times highlighted India’s grossly understated pandemic crisis, and mentioned about 700 million infections and 4.2 million deaths, describing it as the worst-case scenario despite India's official count being 26 million COVID cases with 307,231 deaths according to the data given by the government. Even the total number of infections in India, according to the WHO in December 2023, was 69 crores. This is done in order to bash the Indian PM Narendra Modi, leading to a situation of panic and distrust among the Indian population against its own government, while also affecting the global image of India. Despite the continuous propaganda spread against India by these Western media houses, the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres appreciated India’s efforts in undertaking the COVID management strategy by being the pharmacist for the world in the time of crisis.
In 2023, the Chandrayaan 3 mission was discussed on the UK state-funded BBC channel, and its reporter, Patrick Christys, quoted data in his bulletin stating that 223 million people in India live in poverty and that the UK provides aid for this cause. In his bulletin, he was also sceptical about the aid being provided when a rocket was launched to the dark side of the moon in India, despite a chunk of the population being in poverty. The projection of this narrative highlights the hypocrisy played by the global media against India. As per British data, 20% of its population are poor, destitute and homeless, yet media houses like BBC do not question the state on spending millions on the coronation of 74 year old king rather than resolving the prolonged social issue in their country. This is one of the instances of how global media portrays double standards and fake propaganda against India, which has been prevalent from the time of independence till today.
In this era of artificial intelligence, Information warfare is slowly becoming a primary tool for adversary states and players against India, influencing information and communication means to manipulate and disrupt an adversary’s decision-making and spread fake information to create chaos in those enemy nations. With more than 900 million internet users, India witnessed an increase in disinformation, state-sponsored cyber-attacks, and attempts to spread communal violence through misinformation in the last decade. We can take Disinformation through social media and Cyberattacks against important infrastructures are the major challenges faced by India in Information Warfare.
Disinformation has become a challenge for India. A vast base of active social media users has enabled adversary states to amplify the reach and impact of disinformation, making it a significant concern for governments. It was evident after the recent terrorist attack in Pahalgam that there were a lot of fake news reports citing huge losses on the Indian side, which was wrong. There was a lot of social media news citing communal violence across India, originating from social media accounts handled from Pakistan to incite communal unrest. These disinformation campaigns from the enemy state such as Pakistan, have led to many young people undergoing “Digital Radicalisation”. India is also facing disinformation challenges from within the Nation that we saw during the COVID-19 period and the Manipur violence. Many in the country are misusing social media platforms to spread wrong information against adversary parties and on unfamiliar topics. During the pandemic period, reports of side effects from COVID-19 vaccines led to reluctance from patients to receive vaccines. Also, there were reports of widespread usage of fake remedies and marketing of fraudulent medicines spread through various social media platforms to cure COVID-19. Manipur Violence showed us the intensity of damage caused by social media platforms like WhatsApp. Thousands of messages spreading misinformation, like fake arrests and rape cases were circulated through WhatsApp messages, inciting huge violence between communities. AI-generated photos and content are also flooding Indian social media platforms.
Cyberattacks are the next major challenge for India in Information warfare. Cyberattacks by the adversary nations, China and Pakistan, are rising steadily, especially Chinese hackers backed by the Chinese Government. According to government officials, India saw more than 10 crore cyberattacks just after the Pahalgam attack. There were huge cyberattacks against other critical infrastructures, such as Indian Oil in 2021 and the Mumbai power grid in 2020. There were instances when attackers from Pakistan targeted the personnel data of defence personnel and their families, which posed a grave security challenge for security institutions and military personnels. Even though there were no data losses, there were attempts to attack financial infrastructures such as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and National Stock Exchange (NSE) in May 2025.
Pakistan acting as a messiah of the Islamic community in India, has been spreading lies and propaganda about “Islam in danger” for a long time. It has been very actively propagating agendas like “Hindutva ideology”, “RSS rule”, “oppression of Muslims” , etc in India. Speech of Pakistan army chief on 16 April 2025, where he spewed hate against Hindus, mentioning how they are different from Hindus in thoughts, ambitions and rituals and how that was the basis of the two-nation theory, and asked its population to teach about pakistan formation, and a month later we witnessed a attack at pahelgam where Innocent civilians are killed for being hindus.
Recently an Indian vlogger, named Jyoti Malhotra, was caught sharing with Pakistani Intelligence agency and from her videos and travel history she has been seen visiting pahelgam before the attack, this was a major Information leak, clear proof of her role In pahelgam attack has not been out yet, still these kinds of breach are threat to India, and one of the forms of Information warfare.
Operation Sindoor was the aftermath of Pakistan's terror attack on the Pahelgam killing Innocent civilians, but Pakistan has somehow turned this whole Incident into Operation Sindoor and how India is attacking Pakistan.
Cutting diplomatic ties and revoking the Indus water treaty was one of the primary responses of India post-Pahelgam attack. Pakistan made this step against India as an oppression by India and a reason for waging a war against India, and thus acting as a victim of India’s oppression towards Pakistan.
To counter the flooding of misinformation, the Indian government banned around 8000 accounts on X (former Twitter) were unbanned in Pakistan following the retaliation by Indian against Pakistan terror sites. Earlier, it was banned in Pakistan; the sole purpose of this ban could be the opening of 2nd front of the war. India also banned the YouTube channels of Pakistan, including the YouTube channel of the Pakistani prime minister. Not only Indian government banned YouTube and X accounts it has also banned the accounts of influencers and actors from Instagram, as well as put a complete ban on Pakistani TV channels, to make sure no form of misinformation can be propagated and Pakistan can’t attempt psychological warfare on citizens of India.
MEITY also issued an internet user advisory, which was a list of dos and don’ts on the internet and social media. It asked citizens not to record and post anything related to military activities, it asked not to click on unknown links forwarded in WhatsApp groups or X, and not to post anything sensitive on social media, which can create a panic-like situation among fellow citizens. MeitY also issued directions to media channels to refrain from reporting and broadcasting anything confidential. India activated its press information bureau to do real real-time fact check, which tore apart Pakistan's lies one after another. PIB was very active on X, as it was unbanned by Pakistan during the conflict, so that every fake information can be fact-checked by the government agency itself, thus maintaining trust among the citizens. Press briefings by the Indian armed forces was major highlight of India’s responses to the misinformation campaign ran by Pakistan, 1st briefing held on May 7 2025 informing about the strike carried out by armed forces on terror camp sites in Pakistan, radar images of the strike were also released debunking fake claims by Pakistan, armed forces briefing not only told about the details of strike, it also fact checked Pakistan army fake claims, for example the claim by Pakistan army of attacking Indian military bases was fact checked by air marshal AK Bharti of IAF. A top Indian military officer, Lt Gen DS Rana, Director General Defence Intelligence Agency, briefed the foreign service attaches from 70 nations on the successful conduct of operation Sindoor. He also presented a record of a credible anti-India misinformation campaign conducted by the adversary and its ramifications on regional peace and stability. The Indian embassy in China called out the China State Media Agency Global Times to fact-check the news covered by them and posts by them on X, which led them to delete the post and classify it as fake information.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Adampur air base and met the airmen there, and behind his addressing stage was a tall standing S400 defence system, which was claimed by Pakistan as destroyed by their attack, so Pakistan got fact-checked by the Prime Minister himself; the picture was released for the sole purpose of bursting the propaganda of Pakistan. The Indian government sent seven delegations comprising 59 members, including 31 from the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and 20 members from other parties, visiting 33 capitals all over the world, including the European Union headquarters in Belgium, to expose Pakistan globally and clear the stance of India against terrorism. This delegation had debunked many lies that were spread by Pakistan.
During the recent terror attack at Pahalgam, India, apart from gaining success militarily, it has made numerous efforts in countering waves of information warfare from Pakistan. But these efforts remained ineffective in winning the information warfare against its adversary. Initiatives such as briefing of the Indian Army during Operation Sindoor, debunking of fake images by the Press Information Bureau and release of satellite images of targeted sites were not taken on a timely basis. Before these initiatives, social media had already witnessed the rage from the public of India, delaying the same. While Pakistan’s disinformation campaigns have changed the narrative of the Pahalgam Attack, from being a brutal terror attack to a Kashmir issue, the webinar ‘Kashmir: the Nuclear Flashpoint’, organised by Harvard University, has only seen Pakistani Speakers and American Speakers, but no Indian speakers were present. India has also delayed in initiating the fact-checking processes, allowing the Pakistani’s disinformation campaign to influence the narrative of the Western media despite undertaking fact-checking initiatives themselves.
A similar challenge can also be seen in the Surgical Strikes of 2016 as well as the Balakot Missile Attack of 2019. Despite the DGMO’s response a few hours before the successful execution of the strikes and terminating the operations, as well as planning the information operations in concert with military operations, India had still lost the war front in this conflict in the informational domain. The post-Balakot incident has witnessed India’s slow action with the Foreign Secretary’s statement. A lack of information warfare structures and planning has led the media to continuously change its narrative from Pulwama to Balakot, from Balakot to F-16 downing and the capture and return of Wg. Cdr. Abhinandan. On the contrary, the 1999 Kargil war has seen a positive outcome in countering information warfare. Media, in this regard, played a key role, acting as a force multiplier, as well as contributing to achieving and recapturing the Kargil heights. Under the Director General of Military Intelligence, the Indian Army has made a quick move in establishing and empowering the Army Liaison Cell (ALC) and has comprehended the power of information warfare. Conducting daily briefings with transparency and contributing to the operation’s credibility had furthered a well-thought-out narrative that revolved around the conflict.
India has implemented various strategies to counter the threat of information warfare, many of which can be viewed from a legal perspective. India has recently amended its Information Technology Rules 2021, which presents a significant development in the nation’s strategy to counter information warfare, particularly against Pakistan. This initiative suggests a targeted approach to combat the spread of disinformation. Apart from this, the proposed amendments obligate intermediaries such as social media platforms of Twitter and Facebook to monitor and regulate user content identified as false or misleading by India’s fact-checking unit, Press Information Bureau (PIB). But, while the act has the potential to deter misinformation from its adversaries, it has also generated criticisms over potential misuse of power, censorship and infringement on free speech. This also underscores the delicate balance between maintaining national security and preserving democratic values in the digital age.
Economically, the Ministry of Finance had convened a high-level meeting with stakeholders from the financial sector, where the focus was on bolstering the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), which is now crucial to India’s Digital Economy. The meeting discussed the problem of stock exchange, including the BSE and NSE, being restricted to foreign access and enhanced the initiation of cyber risk monitoring. It has also highlighted several Indian Banks located in border areas, heightening their cybersecurity defences due to their prediction of cash shortages. Due to this, many banks have stocked cash in ATMs located in border areas. These initiatives were undertaken to prevent the possibility of cyber attacks, which obstruct economic activity. The establishment of the PIB Fact Check Unit provides real-time counter-messaging with verified content. Any delay in the process would lead to generating fake narratives through deepfake content, one such instance being the video of the External Affairs Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar, apologising for India’s stance to briefly dominate public discourse. Despite the significant contribution of independent fact-checkers, such as Alt News and Boom, a fragmented approach does leave certain critical gaps. While much of India’s initiative focuses on guarding infrastructure, its overall response and implementation revealed a lack of preparedness in narrative control.
India has also introduced the Personal Data Protection Bill in the year 2019. While the bill omits Section 43A of the IT Act 2000, it gives a wide framework for protecting the privacy of an individual. Recommendations were made before the bill’s implementation, proposing the creation of the Data Protection Authority (DPA) with functions outlined in Clause 41. These functions include monitoring and ensuring compliance with provisions of the Data Protection Law (DPL), as well as maintenance of a database containing the names of significant data fiduciaries along with their ratings in the form of data trust scores under DPL. Under Clause 29 of the bill, the recommendations also proposed data audits by the auditors under DPA. The bill also proposes DPA’s responsibility in advising the parliament, along with the Central and State governments, on measures to be taken to protect personal data. Lastly, it is also tasked with monitoring technological development and commercial practices that may affect data protection practices. Despite such provisions, certain recommendations of the committee have found their place in the bill that would partially help in dealing with the threat of data exploitation. While it clearly elaborates on the definition of sensitive personal data, it provides no explanation on the aspect of critical personal data. One must also remember that the bill is yet to be passed, where certain factors such as the performance of the DPA and the responsibilities if the bill becomes the law, are yet to be seen. On the positive side, it gives power and control to the individuals regarding the processing of their personal data, as well as it also provides the privacy aspect of the problem of election interference through social media.
Following these legal aspects, there are many organisations that were set up with the motive to counter the possibility of information warfare. Section 66F and the National Cyber Security Policy of 2013 have enabled India to have an elaborate structure of surveillance and monitoring of the internet. Recently, ten central government agencies have been officially entitled to monitor and decrypt any kind of information on a computer resource; some of these organisations are the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing, which also have access under section 69B of the IT Act 2000. The Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT) allowed India to have a Central Monitoring System, which allows Income Tax Officials and security agencies to intercept any form of communication over calls or emails through intercept requests. The National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), a lead body responsible for technical intelligence in India, including cybersecurity, data gathering, data processing and strategic monitoring. Its main function lies in reporting to the National Security Advisor, while falling under the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre, which is a nodal agency protecting power and energy, banking, financial institutions and insurance, ICT, etc. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is responsible for protecting the information infrastructure of defence and intelligence agencies. The Computerised Emergency Response Team India (CERT-IN) deals with protecting non-critical informational infrastructure and collecting all reports on cyberattacks and incidents. The creation of the Defence Cyber Agency, after the approval of the Indian Government and the Defence Ministry, is an information warfare branch of the Indian Army consisting of the Army, Navy and Air Force personnel who are tasked with handling cyberwarfare operations under the integrated defence staff. Setting up multiple agencies with different mandates would create problems, leading to turf wars, jeopardising a country’s security situation. Along with this, none of these agencies was reported to have large-scale capabilities of monitoring social media for suspicious activity.
There are other initiatives, such as Satyameva Jayate, PM Gramin Digital Saksharta Abhiyan, National Digital Literary Mission, creation of a Director of General Information Warfare by the Indian Army, etc., established at the grassroots level. Additional initiatives were also made by the Indian government to counter the possibility of information warfare through military advancements. These include raising Command Cyber Operations and Support Wings (CCOSW) to improve the security of communication networks and increase their preparedness in the cyber domain. In the year 1994, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, along with other officials, was sent as an Indian Delegation under the leadership of PM Narasimha Rao to a UN meeting in Geneva to resolve the conflict in Kashmir. While India must enhance and improve its aspect of narrative building in the light of information warfare, cyber defence must also extend beyond firewalls and include cognitive resilience, proactive communication and trust-building mechanisms in the public information space.
India's method of engaging in information warfare remains in formative stages and continues to be mostly reactionary rather than proactive. In particular, the traditional preoccupation of the strategic community lay in territorial and conventional threats. Hence, for the longest time, India never really thought of information warfare as part of its core business of national security. However, with China's border tensions accentuating, with hybrid threats coming from Pakistan, digital interference being cast upon democratic institutions, and disinformation campaigns being waged against domestic cohesion, the doctrine of New Delhi has undergone certain metamorphoses.
There is also a structural contradiction in India, where it must wage information warfare with democratic pluralism, freedom of expression, and a vibrant media ecosystem (though often quite fragmented) as its landmarks. While these principles provide advantages, such as being credible and morally legitimate, they also have a set of drawbacks. For instance, internal disinformation campaigns, foreign influence operations, and the digital amplification of communal tensions.
On the other side, regional and global powers like Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Russia, and the United States investigate divergent and increasingly sophisticated forms of information warfare. Their choices reflect their own political systems, threat perceptions, and geopolitical ambitions.
Pakistan represents the scenario where information warfare has fully permeated statecraft, especially so in its attitudes toward India. One might say that while the ISPR is the public relations arm of the military, it has also developed into an active information operations landscape with a focus on narrative creation, framing of public opinion, launching psychological campaigns, and carrying out coordinated disinformation operations, especially on social media platforms. The infowar atlas that Islamabad runs is deeply slanted toward asymmetric information tactics, wherein low-cost, high-impact digital tools counter India’s conventional superiority. These means translate to proxy accounts, fake news sites, deepfakes, and influencer networks sowing discord within India, especially on sensitive fault lines such as Kashmir, communal tensions, and anti-government sentiment. Studies have indicated Pakistani-linked networks amplifying false narratives during and after the abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir and during episodes of internal unrest in India. All at the same time, Pakistan has institutionalised its cyber capabilities under the military construct of “Cyber Command” and actively cooperates with China for digital technology-related training and infrastructure. Its approach is less encumbered by normative constraints, thereby granting it very high tactical agility, though, at the same time, being concerned with international credibility.
Bangladesh has a distinct role within South Asia when it comes to information warfare practices. The country has emerged as a new player in infowar operations. It is so as its government demonstrated an increasing focus on narrative control together with cyber defence development. Digital tools became essential for the Awami League government led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to exercise authority over political discussions while creating ambiguity between security interests and political censorship. The nation faces strategic concerns which originate from its domestic rivals, together with radical elements and foreign actors who allegedly pursue narrative control through their influence. Dhaka-based organisations accuse India of conducting narrative manipulation in Bangladesh by using civil society actors and intelligence agents while portraying selected regimes as Indian puppets. Indian analysts have expressed worries about the distribution of anti-Indian messages that come from political groups and diaspora networks based in Bangladesh. Bangladesh implements defence-based strategies to protect its interests at home and does not engage in external activities. The nation uses cyber regulatory systems to manage internal affairs through the Digital Security Act (DSA), which remains a subject of controversy without conducting substantial activities abroad. As Bangladesh strengthens its geopolitical position in the Indo-Pacific region, the country may adjust its defensive stance.
Among the most structured and doctrinally articulated infowar strategies worldwide, the Chinese infowar sees its origin with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the “Three Warfares”, i.e. public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. These are not marginal tools; rather, China places central importance on them in the “active defence” doctrine. They are intended to mould perceptions, influence the adversary's decision-making process, and bring about a strategic environment favourable to China before any kinetic conflict. According to Beijing, information dominance is indispensable for its national rejuvenation, its regional hegemony, and in its contest with the United States. The country uses an array of tools, including state-controlled media, technology companies, AI, academic institutions, and diaspora networks, to take its narratives to the world while censoring any dissent at home. State-sponsored campaigns then roll out via platforms such as TikTok, WeChat, and even Western media, targeting foreign populations as well as Chinese-speaking ones abroad. These operations often hide behind cultural diplomacy, economic investment narratives (Belt and Road), and benign development talk. Meanwhile, Chinese information operations also attempt to disparage their opponents, as with the fierce wolf-warrior diplomacy and disinformation over the alleged origins of COVID-19.
The information warfare strategy of Russia has to be one of the most aggressive and advanced in the world, and it is heavily influenced by the Soviet legacy of “active measures.” The Russian doctrine sees the information space as a permanent theatre of war. It is almost as if it is the very blood of Russian military strategy, known given to the world as the “Gerasimov Doctrine,” which suggests that non-military instruments (media manipulation, cyber operations, narrative subversion) can sometimes be much more effective than the use of traditional forces in a contemporary form of conflict. In Russian operations, anything can be seen—from putting a finger on US and European elections to deepening social cleavages in adversarial states. The Kremlin sits in the front row with both overt and covert options, including state-funded broadcasters like RT and Sputnik; troll farms, botnets, artificial personas, and hacking groups like APT28. Created epistemic chaos undermines trust in democratic institutions and divides the population, where the objective is not to convince people but to confuse them. India is, therefore, considered both a partner and a potential target in Russia's infowar calculus. On one hand, the India-Russia relationship remains firm, to the extent that New Delhi is wary of aligning too closely with Western sanctions that might imperil energy or defence ties. On the other hand, the proximity between Russia and China that is deepening, the boldness in cyberspace shown by Russia, and the experimentation with disinformation in global-south settings indirectly threaten India's digital sovereignty and regional influence.
The United States holds a dual status in information warfare, i.e. the object of sustained infowar campaigns and a major perpetrator of sophisticated information operations. Washington truly understands that an even more intensely contested information environment is evolving, crafted by rival states, with the foremost being China and Russia, to cripple U.S. global influence. In response to these attacks, the U.S. has built sophisticated cyber and information warfare structures, such as the U.S. Cyber Command, the Global Engagement Centre (GEC), specialised formations in the State Department, Department of Defence, and the intelligence community etc. These organisations perform both defence and ambiguous offensive work; whether it is exposing adversarial propaganda, disrupting troll networks, or generating counter-narratives in allied and contested areas. Nevertheless, the American way is limited by democratic norms. Policies related to disinformation often infringe upon First Amendment rights, while domestic polarisation does not allow for a coherent approach toward information security. Yet, in the Western world, the United States serves as a benchmark for India in terms of institutional innovation, public-private partnerships (with companies such as Google and Meta), and alliance-building through infowar coalitions (such as the Quad's cyber initiative). For India, deepening engagement with the United States in counter-disinformation exercises, cyber defence drills, and strategic messaging in the Indo-Pacific would help close current institutional and doctrinal gaps.
Vietnam has rapidly emerged as a major player in the domain of information warfare, treating cyberspace as a major element of national security, regime preservation, and strategic sovereignty. In the last 10 years, the Communist Party of Vietnam has developed its own perspective for digital space. They see it not merely as a medium for social communication but rather as a contested battleground for building narratives that suppress dissent and resist foreign influence.
Under the stewardship of Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính, Vietnam set forth a long-term perspective of cyber defence. In 2023, he declared cyber safety would be used for protecting the regime, safeguarding national sovereignty, and promoting economic formation. This represents an ideological construction, one in which online protests are viewed as a sort of “peaceful revolution,” which must be countered by the state against “hostile forces.”
Institutionally, this strategy portrayed two major units as the foundational elements. Task Force 47 was set up in 2016 by the General Political Department and consists of about 10,000 personnel drawn from the ministries and military. It exists to counter "wrongful views," find dissent on social media, mass-report content, and maintain a "healthy cyberspace" in which pro-regime narratives can be freely asserted. Parallel to this is the Cyberspace Operations Command, established in 2017/2018 under the Ministry of National Defence, to lead Vietnam's technical cyber defences in securing military systems, repelling foreign cyber attacks, and protecting national information infrastructure.
The Vietnamese cyber units have also embraced offensive intelligence roles. Under the APT32 operator organisation / OceanLotus, government-linked hackers have used espionage and acquisition of intellectual properties against foreign enterprises of strategic relevance, from an automotive concern in Japan to government networks of China, in support of national security and economic competitiveness. Such formation now has an increasing sophistication that puts it almost on the level with the bigger Cyber-Enabled State Actors, although they engage only in targeted and limited deployment.
Besides, Hanoi has accepted international cooperation for strengthening the national cyber-defensive posture. Exchanges with partners, including India, Australia, the European Union, and multilateral fora, have helped in developing legal frameworks, training exercises for peacekeeping, and intelligence sharing into initiatives such as the UN voluntary norms on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. On the other hand, on a domestic level, efforts have been made to nativize core digital infrastructure, including Viettel's 5G system, so as not to be reliant on foreign vendors like Huawei, which is a reflection of strategic caution in its wider infowar calculus.
Nevertheless, Vietnam finds its infowar apparatus faced with major limitations. Analysts find that while Force 47 can identify and amplify favourable content for the regime, it remains limited in effective narrative operations over a more extended duration, basically owing to a lack of sufficient skills, infrastructural technological support, and coordinated efforts between organs of the state. And yet, this promotion of a historically oblique mix of repression and surveillance has undoubtedly increased concerns relating to freedom of expression, with domestic and international bodies watching with keen interest at the possible overreach and censorship proliferating under the guise of cybercrime laws.
This war has shown India that how the spectrum of the war is changing in today’s world, it is not only the missiles and jets that wins us the war, it’s much more than that, war can be won in battlefields, but it is the story or narrative that will make you the real winners of war, and that story will tell the world your prospects and give you a chance to stand in the queue of the world power. This conflict has demonstrated to India that the nature of warfare is evolving in the contemporary world. Victory is not solely achieved through missiles and aircraft; it encompasses considerably more. While battles may be won on the physical ground, it is the narrative, the story articulated, that ultimately designates the true victors of a conflict. This narrative will convey a nation's aspirations globally and secure its position among prospective world powers. Our policy makers needs to understand this soon and they need to equally invest in this front of war as they are investing and developing their defence capabilities, because this is where world is heading they need to see the story to believe your stance and endeavours, with india’s digital age and its revolution in the digital space, the onus lies upon us to show the world the real story and protect our country in the second front of the war that is information warfare.
The Ministry of Defence must draw up such a doctrine, which covers perception management, disinformation deterrence, digital influence operations, and AI-enhanced psychological tactics as components of India’s national security policy. A well-established information and electronic war strategy is the need of the hour for India. With growing attempts at information and cyber attacks on India, there is a huge requirement for an information war strategy. Our two neighbours, China and Pakistan have already have this strategy with designated separate wings for the same, and they are investing heavily to win the war on this front. China’s Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW) employs wide-ranging electronic and network-centric warfare techniques, including cyberattacks and espionage, to deter and disrupt enemy capabilities. It has established control and is monitoring all digital platforms. Pakistan’s army Inter-Services Public Relations Agency(ISPR) came up in 1949, within control and strict command under ISI, for over half century it has been spreading a carefully crafted narrative of “islam in danger”, and its real efficacy started after the internet revolution in 2000s, it has established a astonishing network of information warfare specialists, it recruits through various internship programs with sole agenda of spreading propaganda against India and persuading its public to believe in dominance of Pakistan.
In cyber-diplomacy, the time for defensive action is behind us. One must now invest in counter-narrative architecture—including information offensives targeting adversarial audiences, especially across South Asia, the Middle East, and home to diasporic populations—with an underlying narrative that includes pluralism, stability, and tech sovereignty.
India needs to have an active monitoring and early warning system, which can be set up under the central Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. A total of 1.12 billion cellular mobile connections were active in India in early 2025, with this figure equivalent to 76.6% of the total population, and 806 million individuals using the internet in India at start of 2025, and home to 491 million active social media users, this is the level of digital and internet penetration in India and with only 38% of households are digitally literate, fear of information warfare attack is alarming to India as digital illiteracy will make people fall in the trap of misinformation and cyber attack. So it’s high time that India should have active monitoring and early warning systems.
As suggested by our first CDS General Bipin Rawat, India needs a dedicated strategic information warfare organisation and its integration into the overall defence strategy. The scale and scope of this organisation must be large enough to enable it to conduct strategic Information Warfare operations of an offensive nature against China and Pakistan. It will create content that will seek to exploit a country’s ethnic faultlines, such as providing propaganda support to public protests and separatist movements in restive regions of Pakistan (Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and China (Tibet, Xinjiang). Another crucial task of this Information Warfare organisation will be to develop offensive cyber warfare capabilities that can target the critical digital infrastructures of economic, political and military institutions in China and Pakistan. This Information Warfare organisation must also develop the capabilities to utilise new technologies like artificial intelligence to disseminate pro–Indian narratives abroad in friendly countries, which can help enhance the Indian government’s ability to achieve India’s foreign policy objectives.
A “voice of India” is the need of the hour, which can carry the message and story of India to the world. Most countries have channels which tell their narrative and stance, which are funded by the government, and we need to scale it to the level that the world listens and takes cognisance of our narrative.
forging strong alliances with other states and international organisations can help in the propagation of India's story to the world, as well can amplify the responses against misinformation. This was seen in the recent war with Pakistan, where Pakistan was backed by China and Turkey extensively. Chinese state media ‘Global Times’ shared misinformation about the Rafale being shot down by Pakistan.
India’s vulnerability to cyber-attacks, primarily, has its roots in a lack of governmental control, in line with the constitutional right of freedom of expression, overflow of information, be it on the internet or media/social platforms. The primary factors contributing to India's vulnerability to cyber-attacks are rooted in the limited governmental control, which is constrained by the constitutional right to freedom of expression, and the overwhelming flow of information across the internet and various media/social platforms. In contrast, China enjoys full control over the flow of information. In this scenario, India, in order to protect its cyberspace from information warfare, needs to maintain a proper balance between democratic principles and national security.
India can have proper coordination with its embassy all over the world, and the embassy can raise its voice and debunk lies fabricated against India, as was done by the Indian embassy in China, which led to the deletion of the post made by its mouthpiece “Global Times” on X.
India should publicly link infowar disruption with conventional and cyber deterrence, especially in South Asia. The state should put forward a very clear red-line policy under which conduct of hostile IW operations, such as electoral interference, military discreditation, etc., by particular states, could prompt a well-calibrated response, kinetic or non-kinetic. This red-line policy needs to be effectively communicated to the state adversaries.
India must counter narrative offensives from Pakistan and China in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, which portray India as hegemonic or inwardly unstable. A South Asia Infowar Division under the ambit of MEA must be instituted to curate positive narratives and counter destabilising disinformation.
India should institutionalise media literacy in friendly neighbours, offer training in cyber hygiene, and share disinformation intelligence with critical neighbours such as Bhutan, Bangladesh, and the Maldives, calibrated to be a "regional provider of cognitive security."
Create digital campaigns highlighting Indian heritage, pluralism, the success of the diaspora, and innovation. Use ICCR, Doordarshan World, and MEA strategically to seed a positive effect toward India in neutral states where Chinese or Pakistani “Information Warfare” campaigns are targeted.
To counter this, the Ministry of Defence, along with the Ministry of State of Electronics and Information Technology, should establish a framework feasible for the local citizens to counter future incidents of information warfare. The nation's strategic cyber capability can be enhanced through international cooperation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of State of Electronics and Information Technology should collaborate with allies, including the US, Russia, the EU, and Israel, to build alliances and engage in meaningful discussions.
To minimize the possibility of information warfare, domestic collaboration is also crucial. Indian media houses, such as the Times of India and the Hindustan Times, need to form coalitions and negotiate a mechanism to counter fake news, ensure the population receives verified information, and implement continuous Monitoring and Evaluation processes for fact-checking within the country.
Cybersecurity measures should be formulated to protect critical infrastructure, important data and communication systems from hackers and malware. This also requires enhancing capacity building initiatives of updating defence infrastructure from time to time, as well as training staff for fixing new vulnerabilities regarding tech. Infrastructure etc. Apart from these, the Indian government, involving ministries, needs to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive approach, the ‘grand plan’, to combat the information warfare targeting the Indian psyche, with a specific focus on youth who often generate discontent against the government and communal discord.
India has earned a significant place in the global IT Industry and aspires to be an IT superpower in future while being connected to the global village. Thus, it is imperative for the country to establish a Board deploying the officers in safeguarding the IT infrastructure of India, and to practice mechanisms to counter various technological threats of disinformation, cyber espionage and trafficking. In addition, the existing agencies need to develop techniques to identify patterns of breaches and cyberterrorism and establish communication mediums with the general public in order to prevent the possibility of large-scale social media interference.
OSINT, which stands for Open Source Intelligence, refers to the practice of gathering information from publicly available sources. It involves collecting, analysing, and disseminating publicly accessible data from social media, news articles, public records, and websites to produce actionable intelligence. It is high time that India should invest in an OSINT agency, so that India can have an edge in information warfare, which will help not only in just monitoring narratives which are propagated by agencies of hostile nations, but also can help in preparing a framework to attack in this domain of warfare and claim high ground.
In the Mahabharata, the strategic deployment of information proved decisive. Lord Krishna secured victory against the formidable warrior Drona, not through direct engagement, but by employing a nuanced strategy: calculated deception. Krishna orchestrated a scenario that led Drona to believe his son, Ashwatthama, had perished. This artifice compelled Drona to relinquish his arms, thereby facilitating his defeat. This incident underscores the paramount importance of leveraging information as a strategic asset.
Despite our heritage from the land of Lord Krishna, we are currently at a disadvantage in information warfare. As the battlegrounds have shifted, mastering the narrative war is now a prerequisite to achieving victory in the actual conflict. Pakistan and China are ahead of us in this front of the war, they have been practising the skills of this warfare from long time ago, Pakistan has established ISPR in 1949, earlier of half century they were very active in propagating the message of “Islam in danger”, and post 2000s it has been very active persuading the view of their own citizens as well as in spreading the propaganda against India, whereas China’s three pronged strategy “san zong zhangfa” has been very active in 3 warfare techniques: media warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare. India needs to have an organisation and a cognitive operation unit which can specifically detect, debunk and neutralise hostile content regularly. India has been lacking a voice of its own, unlike many other countries like the BBC for Britain, The NewYork Times for the USA, and Global Times as the mouthpiece of China. India needs a voice that can be heard all over the world, backed by our government. The government should be investing more in building the capabilities of information warfare, as it is doing for defence capabilities. India's democratic ethos and technological prowess position it uniquely to lead global responses to information warfare, yet this requires paradigm shifts that can be achieved only if it moves from checking only facts to proactive narrative building. The challenge lies in transforming federal diversity into strength rather than vulnerability, ensuring that digital services are available to rural, tribal and multilingual areas, not only to metro-area residents. By leveraging soft cultures like Bollywood and yoga and strong digital systems like Aadhaar and UPI, India can develop counter-narrative tales that stress the ability of pluralistic democracy to resist the threats of digital tyranny.
The road ahead demands not just savvier algorithms, but commitments from the community itself, where every citizen becomes a soldier in the war against deception and fake news. As conflicts increasingly move into cognitive domains, India needs to improve its cybersecurity methods and rules to respond to heightened dangers, since enemies are collaborating more closely with tech experts. This comprehensive approach must integrate some constitutional mandates along with technical interoperability, so federal diversity becomes a base for digital equity and the country’s well-being.
Nikhil Tiwari
Apoorva Roy
Nikhil Tiwari
Maheshwar S. Thampy
Devesh Bisht
Smiti Iyer
Nikhil Tiwari
Smiti Iyer
Ritika Verma
Tiesverse — India's youth-led research, media and technology organisation.